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CETACEAN RIGHTS UNDER HUMAN LAWS
Pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, a per-
mit, which has sparked great public interest and debate, was is-
sued to Sea World Inc. allowing them to scientifically study ninety
orca whales and capture ten whales for public display. This Com-
ment will analyze the standards a court would use to review the
controversial permit, and will discuss the proposed legal actions
and options of those opposed to the permit. The Comment will
then change its perspective and advocate protecting the animals by
granting cetaceans themselves legal rights, and will examine the
justifications and advantages of this new approach.
INTRODUCTION
We need another, a wiser and perhaps a more mystical concept of animals.
Remote from universal nature, and living by complicated artifice, man in
civilization surveys the creature through the glass of his knowledge and
sees thereby a feather magnified and the whole image in distortion. We
patronize them for our incompleteness,for their tragic fate of having taken
orm so far below ourselves. And therein we err, we greatly err. For the
animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more complete
than ours, they move more finished and complete. They are gifted with
extensions of senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices we
shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings; they are
other nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow pris-
oners of the splendor and travail of the earth.'
In the last two decades, cetaceans (whales, dolphins and
porpoises) have captured the attention and concern of a large num-
ber of people. Although previously the interest in these animals was
limited to their economic or scientific value, an increasing national
concern with man's impact on cetaceans has expressed itself in do-
mestic legislation. This Comment will analyze whether the permit
procedure of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19722 (MMPA
or Act) can adequately accomplish the Act's purported goal of ceta-
cean protection. In the Comment's first section, the arguments for
and against a permit recently issued to Sea World, Inc. to capture
killer whales (Orcinus orcas) for public display and scientific re-
search will be discussed to exemplify the current-and often conflict-
1. H. BETSON, THE DUTERMOST HOUSE (1928), quoted in H. ELLIS, THE BOOK OF
WHALES 14 (1980).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982).
July-August 1984 Vol. 21 No. 4
ing-attitudes towards protecting and understanding cetaceans. The
Sea World permit will also provide a case study for analyzing the
scope of judicial review of permits provided for in the Act. In the
second section, the Comment will look beyond judicial review of a
specific permit issuance, and will suggest a new legal approach to
protecting cetaceans as holders of legal rights enforceable in court.
This section will examine the issue of standing, and will include the
ethical and scientific justifications for recognizing standing for
cetaceans in their own right.
I
PERMITS AND PROTECTION
The Marine Mammal Protection Act
In the early 1970s, Congress realized man's activities were seri-
ously endangering certain species of marine mammals. As a 1972
House Report acknowledged, the American public was increasingly
alarmed at the predictions of extinction for species of whales, at the
documentary television reports on the uncontrolled killing of baby
harp seals, and at the increased drownings of porpoises in the U.S.
tuna fleet's nets in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.4 With a na-
tional election imminent, a growing influence of environmental
groups, and amidst an unprecedented passage of environmental legis-
lation, the 92nd Congress considered protective legislation.5
The consensual goal was to conserve and protect marine mam-
mals, but the legislative history reveals considerable conflict over the
best method. 6 Two views sparked heated debate: the "protectionists"
advocated a complete ban on all killing; the "managers" wanted an
extensive program of resource management calculated to provide an
"optimum sustainable yield."7 Congress chose a compromise. Never-
3. See H. R. REP. No. 92-707, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4144 (hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT).
4. Id. at 4145, 4148-49.
5. See Coggins, Legal Protection for Marine Mammals: An Overview of Innova-
tive Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENVTL. L. 1, 11, 14 (1975).
6. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4152.
7. Protectionists (or preservationists) argued the only effective way to protect the
animals is a complete ban on all killing of marine mammals and the importation of any
product made thereof. See generally Herrington & Regenstein, The Plight of Ocean
Mammals, 1 ENVTL. AFFAiRS 792 (1972) (article discusses the "ban" approach to animal
preservation).
Resource oriented biologists, various federal agencies, and representatives of entities
with an economic interest in marine mammals called, for the traditional management
approach. That approach was based on the concept of maximum sustainable yield. See
Coggins, supra note 5, at 16. This approach aims to regulate species harvesting so that it
is near the point of greatest return without causing the population size to decrease. The
maximum sustainable yield concept has been widely criticized because it fails to consider
variables such as age, sex, cyclical or unpredictable changes in stocks unrelated to man's
[VOL. 21: 911, 1984] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
theless, the Act demonstrates the compromise was balanced towards
a protectionist position.8
In the Act's definitional section, the terms conservation and man-
agement are used interchangeably.9 The Act's goal is to regulate the
taking of marine mammals, and by using biological information, the
Act aims to maintain populations at their "optimum sustainable
populations" (a scientific term meaning the range between the num-
ber of animals which will maximize species productivity, at the same
time maintaining the largest population the ecosystem can sup-
port).10 Congress rejected the idea that these animals are best left
alone; the Act reflects the position that when man interferes with the
ecosystem, an obligation arises not only to protect, but to affirma-
tively act to preserve it."
Substance of the Act
The Act places a moratorium on the taking and importing of
marine mammals and marine mammal products.12 "Taking" is
broadly defined to mean harass, hunt, kill, or attempt to harass,
hunt, or kill.' The principal responsibility to administer the Act is
divided between the Department of Commerce and the Department
of the Interior. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (Fisheries Ser-
vice), administers the Secretary of Commerce's program for
cetaceans and pinnipeds (other than walruses). 4
impact, and predatory and competitive interaction between species. See Nafzinger, The
Management of Marine Mammals After the Fisheries Conservation and Management
Act, 14 WILLAMETTE L. J. 153, 172-73 n. 83 (1978).
8. See Coggins, supra note 5, at 17.
9. The terms "conservation" and "management" are defined by the act as mean-
ing collection and application of biological information for the purposes of increasing and
maintaining the number of animals within species and marine mammal populations at
their optimum sustainable population. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(2) (1976), amended by Act of
Oct. 9, 1981, Pub. L. N. 97-58, 95 Stat. 979 (1981).
10. In the original act, populations were to be maintained at their "optimum carry-
ing capacity." 16 U.S.C. § 1362(2)(1976). The 1981 amendments substituted the terms
"carrying capacity" or "maximum sustainable population," in order to clarify the popu-
lation range in question, and to make the standard more understandable to the scientific
community and administrative agencies implementing the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (B)
& (D)(1982). For an extensive discussion of these Amendments, see Note, Congress
Amends the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 62 OR. L. REV. 257, 267-71 (1983).
11. See Coggins, supra note 5, at 18.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1982).
13. Id. at § 1362(12).
14. Id. at § 1362(1 1)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 216.8 (1983). The Secretary of the Interior,
through the Fish and Wildlife Service, has responsibility for walruses, polar bears, sea
The moratorium on the taking of marine mammals is not a com-
plete ban, and the Act specifies certain exemptions. Certain Alaskan
natives may take marine mammals for subsistence and production of
handicrafts. 15 Under a permit system, marine mammals may be
taken for public display or scientific research,"' and incidental to
commercial fishing.17 The 1981 Amendments allow persons other
than commercial and noncommercial fishers to take limited numbers
of marine mammals without following the Act's normal regulation
and permit requirements.18
The Act makes management of marine mammals a federal re-
sponsibility; however, it allows management to be returned to the
states under a specified procedure. It provides for civil penalties up
to $10,000 and criminal fines up to $20,000 or one year in jail, or
both, for violation of its provisions, permits, or regulations.2 0 Seizure
and forfeiture sanctions are available to enforcing agencies.21 It fur-
ther provides for the establishment of an internationally-directed
program through the Secretary of State,22 for research, grant, and
equipment development programs,2 3 and has reporting 2' and appro-
priations provisions.25 A three-member Marine Mammal Commis-
sion is established by the Act to make recommendations to the Sec-
retary of Commerce (in the case of cetaceans) in connection with the
management and protection of the animals.26
Jurisdiction
The Act's scope includes persons or vessels on the high seas sub-
ject to United States jurisdiction, or on land or water within U.S.
otters, marine otters, manatees, and dugongs. Id. at § 1362(11)(B).
15. Id. § 1371(b).
16. Id. § 1371(a).
17. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
18. Id. § 1371(a)(4)(5) (1982). This provision is intended to apply to offshore oil
and gas developers. See H.R. REP. No. 97-228, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1981
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1458, 1469-70 (1981). Oil and gas development and
exploration have direct and indirect impacts on marine mammals and the ecosystem. See
1981 ANN. REP. MARINE MAMMAL COMM. 73 (1982).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1982).
20. Id. 9 1375.
21. Id. 9 1376.
22. Id. 9 1378.
23. Id. 9§ 1380-1381.
24. The Act requires the appropriate Secretary to publish annual reports regarding
the status of marine mammal species and populations, and to publish reports on agency
decisions including the issuance of permits. Id. § 1373(0.
25. For example, the Department of Commerce was issued $7,223,000 for fiscal
year 1982, $8,000,000 for fiscal year 1983, and $8,800,000 for fiscal year 1984. 16
U.S.C. § 1384 (1982).
26. Id. §§ 1401-1407. The Commission must submit an annual report to Congress.
Id. § 1404.
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jurisdiction.27 A presumption against extraterritorial extension of
U.S. statutes was applied to the MMPA in United States v. Mitch-
ell.28 In that case, the court of appeals reversed the conviction of an
American citizen who had captured twenty-one dolphins within the
three-mile territorial limit of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 2 9
The court reasoned that when Congress considers environmental leg-
islation, it presumably recognizes the authority of other sovereign
states to preserve or exploit the natural resources within their own
territory.30 The court emphasized that to apply the Act extraterrito-
rially, clear congressional intent to extend the application of the stat-
ute to foreign sovereign territories must be shown.3'
When the MMPA was enacted, the Act applied up to the edge of
the twelve-mile fishery zone.3 2 The Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act of 197633 unilaterally extended both the United States
fisheries jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the MMPA to cover a
200-nautical-mile zone from the shore baseline. 4 General permits to
fish in the U.S. fishery conservation zone are issued to foreign fishing
associations whose nations have a Governing International Agree-
ment with the United States. 5
27. Id. § 1372(a)(1)(2).
28. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
29. Id. at 997.
30. Id. at 1002.
31. Id. at 1002, 1004. Although the court's holding is technically correct, because
neither the Act nor the legislative history reveal an intent to apply the Act to foreign
territories, the decision may result in the Act being circumvented by American citizens.
A black market for the sale of dolphins may have arisen since the MMPA's passage.
Dolphins have become an increasingly popular tourist attraction, and apparently there
are few proficient dolphin catchers outside the United States. As a result, European mar-
kets will reportedly pay between $5,000 and $10,000 for a healthy specimen. According
to a Fisheries Service special agent, since the U.S. v. Mitchell decision, the Service has
shut down the foreign intelligence network. The Trouble with Dolphins, 155 NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC 506, 521, 528 (April, 1979). Apparently oceanariums are replacing their killer
whales with whales caught by Icelandic fishermen, who seek out buyers. Although the
details are shrouded in secrecy, at the orca symposium in Seattle, in October, 1980, the
rumored price for one of these whales was $150,000. See ELLIS, WHALES AND DOLPHINS
188 (1982).
32. Pub. L. No. 92-522 § 3(15), 86 Stat. 1027, 1029 (1972) (amended 1981). For
a description of the "fisheries zone" limit, see Act of October 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
658, 80 Stat. 408 (1966).
33. Pub. L. No. 94-265 § 2-406, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
34. Pub. L. No. 94-265 § 101, 90 Stat. 404 (1976).
35. 1982-83 ANN. REP. DEP'T COM. MARINE MAMMAL PROTECrION ACT 1972 4
(1983) (hereinafter cited as DEP'T Com. 82/83 REP.). Thus for example, a three year
permit for the incidental taking of 5,975 porpoises was issued to the Japan Fisheries
Agency. Of these, 5,500 are Dall's porpoises that die in drift gillnets used in Japan's high
seas salmon fishery in the North Pacific Ocean. Id. In an action brought by an environ-
Permits
The Fisheries Service publishes rules and regulations in order to
implement the Act, and is responsible for making decisions to waive
the moratorium by issuing or denying permits. Three steps must be
taken before a permit can be granted. Upon receipt and initial re-
view by the Service, notice of the application and an invitation to
submit written data or views must be published in the Federal Regis-
ter.3" The Fisheries Service may then afford interested parties an op-
portunity for a public hearing.37 The hearing is discretionary with
the agency. However, the Act's legislative history reveals an intent to
encourage and allow public participation.38
The type of hearing the Act contemplates is important because the
type of hearing determines the standard of judicial review (to be dis-
cussed later in the Comment). 31 The Act allows a public hearing,
and the federal agency regulations state a summary record is to be
kept.40 The judicial review provision does not require a determina-
tion on the record; an adversary hearing, with evidence subject to
cross-examination, is unnecessary.41 The hearing is an informal pro-
ceeding at which written and oral arguments are presented at a pub-
lic hearing before the governing agency.42 After considering the
comments, the Service approves or denies the application.43
The Sea World Controversy
Notice was published in the Federal Register that an application
had been filed by Sea World Inc. of San Diego for a permit to take
killer whales for scientific research and public display. 4 Sea World
mental group, the District Court in Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Baldridge, No. 81 Civ.
1547 (D.D.C. 1982), upheld the agency's issuance of the permit. Case discussed in
DEP'T COM. 82/83 REP. at 18-19.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(2) (1982).
37. Id. § 1374(d)(4). Any interested party may appear in person or through repre-
sentatives at the hearing and may submit any relevant material, view, comments, argu-
ments, or exhibits. 50 C.F.R. § 216.33(b) (1983).
38. The Secretary is authorized to grant public hearings upon request of any inter-
ested party, and is instructed to act in an expeditious fashion and to make full public
disclosure of his action in issuing or denying a requested permit. HousE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 4158. See also 117 CONG. REc. 34, 44951 (1971), where Congressman Dingell
said that although public hearings are discretionary, the house committee is "strongly of
the opinion that this discretion should continue to be exercised in the direction of full
disclosure and open hearings in controversial cases."
39. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
40. 50 C.F.R. § 216.33(b) (1983).
41. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.10 at 448-49 (2d ed.
1979).
42. For a discussion of the appropriateness of this type of informal hearing, see K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.12 at 241-42 (2d ed. Supp. 1982).
43. 50 C.F.R. § 216.33(c) (1983).
44. Notice of Application for Sea World Inc. to Take and Display Killer Whales,
48 Fed. Reg. 53, 11310 (1983).
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requested up to ten animals for public display and captive breeding.
Up to ninety were requested for scientific research: to be studied,
sampled, and marked. The research animals were to be captured,
some for up to three weeks, and then released. The activities were to
be conducted in the waters off Alaska and California.4
After reviewing more than two-thousand public comments and
holding a two-day public hearing in Seattle on August 16 and 17,
1983, the federal agency granted the permit on November 1, 1983.48
The permit will allow Sea World to capture ten killer whales for
captivity. Because a requirement limits the number of animals that
can be taken for display or breeding during any one year to an aver-
age of one percent of the minimum estimated population,47 Sea
World will probably be permitted to catch only two whales a year
for display and breeding.48 The permit prohibits the taking of any
pregnant, nursing, or unweaned animals, and if any whale dies dur-
ing capture it will be counted against the ten. All further testing and
capture will be suspended until the death-causing incident is thor-
oughly studied.49
The Fisheries Service permit restricts the scope of Sea World's
research to taking blood samples and measuring, tagging, and mark-
ing the animals. The agency refused the request to hold some orca
whales for up to three weeks, stating the aquarium must submit for
approval a research plan showing the animals held for extended time
would rejoin an orca whale group when released. A limit of thirty
whales per year can be temporarily captured, and they must be re-
turned to the water as soon as testing is completed, usually within a
matter of hours.50 The Service further stated that until assured that
the whales will not be subject to undue stress, no tooth extraction,
liver biopsies, or stomach sampling can be performed. Permission to
perform these tests had been requested by Sea World last
February.5'
No animals can be taken from California waters until authorized
45. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Press Release
No. 83-61 (Nov. 1, 1983) (hereinafter cited as Commerce Press Release).
46. United States Dept. of Commerce, NOAA, National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), Notice of Issuance of Permit 3510-22
(1983).
47. United States Dept. of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS, Permit to Take
Marine Mammals, Permit No. 439 (hereinafter cited as Permit).
48. Commerce Press Release, supra note 45, at 1-2.
49. Permit, supra note 47, at 3.
50. Commerce Press Release, supra note 45, at 1-2.
51. Id. at 1.
by the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries. 52 However, the permit
provides that after at least one year's activities in Alaska, and after
submitting additional information on the animals' populations and a
detailed report on the numbers of animals proposed for California,
Sea World can seek authorization to conduct capture activities in
California.53 Thus, under the existing permit, taking whales off Cali-
fornia waters has not been prohibited indefinitely. The marine park
stated plans, at the time the permit was issued, to begin the five-
year, 1.5 million dollar program in the summer of 1984.5"
Arguments on Each Side
Many believe that Sea World, an accredited zoological institution,
successfully combines entertainment with education, and has con-
tributed to shaping positive public opinion about whales.55 Since the
first park opened in 1964, over 75 million people have seen killer
whales at Sea World of San Diego, and its two sister facilities, near
Cleveland, Ohio, and Orlando, Florida. Last year more than 6.6 mil-
lion people visited these three parks, and the overwhelming majority
of them would never had had a chance to see similar animals in the
wild. 6 Supporters of the permit argue that only an elitest approach
would suggest that if people cannot afford to travel to see killer
whales in the wild, they should remain at home and merely watch
them on television. Marine Parks, they assert, allow the public to
learn about the whales in person. 7
At the public hearing in Seattle, Sea World argued that an in-
formed and educated public58 constitutes the best possible protection
for marine resources; and its current project is aimed at instigating a
captive propagation program to insure the continued availability of
killer whales for educational and public display. Sea World sup-
ported its captive breeding program with the successful births of
52. Permit, supra note 47, at 2.
53. Id.
54. Los Angeles Times (San Diego ed.), Nov. 2, 1983, pt. II,
at 1, col. 5.
55. See Will, The Orcas of Sea World, NEWSWEEK 72 (Aug. 29, 1983); see also,
Hearings Before National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA), Seattle Public Hearings,
35-43 (Aug. 1983) (testimony of Dr. L. Cornell, Senior Vice-Pres. and Zoological Dir. of
Sea World) [hereinafter cited as Public Hearings].
56. Public Hearings, id. at 31 (testimony of R. Hillebrecht, Executive Vice-Pres.
of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. and Chief Exec. Off. of Sea World).
57. Id. at 116-17 (testimony of W. Braker, Director of the John G. Shedd Aqua-
rium in Chicago).
58. Opponents to the permit argue the actual educational value of whales in cap-
tivity is negligible. Marine park shows, where the animals jump through hoops or give
trainers rides, do not portray the animals as accurately as, for example, a film of a whale
with her newborn calf. It is misleading, opponents assert, for the whale capture industry
to claim credit for the current public sympathy for whales. Id. at 77-81 (testimony of V.
Boe, Project Coordinator for Greenpeace International).
918
[VOL. 21: 911, 1984] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
twenty-seven bottle-nosed dolphins in the last five years.59 One sup-
porter of the permit hypothesized that a denial could jeopardize all
captive breeding programs, programs that presently are the only way
to ensure many threatened or endangered species' survival.60 Al-
though the latter argument is currently irrelevant (killer whales are
not an endangered species),"' if Sea World can successfully breed
the animals the park will not need to take others from the wild in the
future.
The science and research will be carried out by Hubbs-Sea World
Research Inst., a non-profit, private-operating foundation. Testifying
at the public hearing, a spokesperson for Hubbs said the ability to
detect current and future environmental problems (such as pollution)
is directly related to knowledge about natural populations.62 The
spokesperson argued, the physiological effects of manmade sounds
(boats or seismic noise) on these animals and their behavioral re-
sponses, which may someday be crucial to the survival of the species,
can only be obtained from studying captive animals.8 3 Hubbs argued
that the present state of diminished government and private research
funding threatens a standstill in most cetacean research. Therefore,
the coordinated research program on killer whales, which Sea World
will support, is an important scientific opportunity.e"
Despite such supporting arguments, the majority of those testify-
ing at the public hearing spoke against the permit. While commend-
ing Sea World's record of spending its own funds on animal rescue
and rehabilitation work,6 5 and although not opposed, in principle, to
animals being kept in captivity,66 opponents were concerned with ef-
fects of captivity on orcas. A primary concern was that while a con-
servative estimate of an orca whale's life span in the wild is 48 years,
59. Id. at 40 (testimony of Dr. Cornell).
60. Id. at 119-20 (testimony of W. Braker).
61. Id. at 12 (testimony of Congressman D. Bonker, D-Wash.).
62. Id. at 130-31 (testimony of Steve Leatherwood, Hubbs-Sea World Research
Inst. biologist).
63. Id. at 184, 185 (testimony of Prof. Awbrey, Senior Research Fellow at Hubbs-
Sea World Research Inst.).
64. Id. at 131 (testimony of S. Leatherwood).
65. Sea World, at its three installations, rescues and treats approximately 400 ani-
mals each year at an average cost of approximately $1,000 per animal. Like almost every
coastal aquarium and oceanarium, Sea World is on call to pick up and accept sick, in-
jured, orphaned, or stranded animals. Id., supra note 57, at 118 (testimony of W.
Braker).
66. Id. at 47 (testimony of A. Reichman, Wildlife Coord. for Greenpeace
Northwest).
the average life span of whales in captivity is 7.2 years.67 Since a
replication of an orca's habitat cannot be presently reproduced, op-
ponents characterized confining the whales in relatively small tanks
as "cruel and inhumane" treatment.68
In Washington state, where Sea World attempted to capture orcas
at Budd Inlet in 1976, strong local opposition to the permit existed.
Opponents claimed that by using seal bombs, high-speed boats, and
seaplanes,"9 Sea World engaged in inhumane treatment and violated
several provisions of their permit.70 Further, the Washington Attor-
ney General commenced an action against Sea World and numerous
state and federal agencies.71 The complaint was dismissed after Sea
World agreed to release the whales it had in its possession and to
never again capture orcas in Washington state waters.7 2 Because it
was the same applicant applying for the permit, and because Sea
World's application was vague regarding the methods which would
be used to capture the whales, a fear of duplicate capture techniques
was expressed. a
Orca whales have never been bred successfully in captivity despite
67. Id. at 49. In a 1981 study, Dr. M. Briggs of the Canadian Depart. of Fisheries
and Oceans, determined that orca adult males lived to be 48 years while adult females
may live as long as 80 to 100 years. Id. One study of 61 killer whales captured in the last
20 years, concluded they live an average of only 2.8 years in captivity. Id. at 45 (testi-
mony of Congressman N. Dicks, R-Wash.). Sea World claims a 1979 scientific census
put the average at 10 years or more. Id. at 42 (testimony of Dr. L. Cornell).
68. Id. at 85 (testimony of W. Oliver). These powerful mammals are thought to
have an average 100 miles-a-day range traveling in their ocean environment. 129 CONG.
REc. H10148 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983)(statement of Rep. Chandler). Another opponent
argued that before the whales die in captivity, they suffer what researchers are beginning
to identify as a type of insanity. Erratic, uncooperative, and sometimes downright dan-
gerous behavior has been reported in the news concerning whales at Sea World in San
Diego. Public Hearings, supra note 55, at 219 (testimony of K. Sinats, Dir. for Green-
peace Foundation of Canada). See e.g., San Diego Union, Feb. 24, 1984, at B-3, col. 4(killer whale seized trainer in its mouth during a show).
69. Public Hearings, supra note 55, at 192 (testimony of Tammie Bison, citizen of
Seattle).
70. Id. at 17 (testimony of R. Munro, Secretary of State for Wash. State); Id. at 4(statement of U.S. Senator Slade Gorton).
71. Id. at 16-17 (testimony of R. Munro); Id. at 3-4 (statement of Senator
Gorton).
72. Id. Washington state has since approved a resolution, expressing the will of the
legislature, that orca whales may not be captured or harassed within the state's three-
mile jurisdiction. Although the resolution may not be enforceable in court (the MMPA
might preempt such state legislation because of the doctrine of federal supremacy), it is
highly unlikely that Sea World would again risk bad publicity and seek a permit to
capture orcas in Washington state waters.
73. Id. at 22-23 (testimony of R. Munro). Sea World was also accused of another
incident of cruel capture techniques. In 1970, in Pen Cove on Whidby Island, citizens
reported that more that 80 whales were driven into the cove and netted. Between three
and six allegedly died. It was alleged the dead animals then had their bellies slit open,
were weighed down (purportedly by chains, rocks, or concrete), and were then taken out
to sea and sunk. These actions were an apparent attempt to keep the public from learn-
ing of the animal's deaths as a result of the capture technique. Id. at 22.
920
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repeated attempts; therefore, opbonents to the permit argued it is
unrealistic to expect that Sea World can do so by using ten more
whales.7 4 A spokesperson for the Fund for Animals argued that be-
cause no provision exists in the MMPA to capture orca whales for
the purpose of husbandry, and because it is not within the spirit of
the statute to encourage domestic breeding of marine mammals, the
captive breeding program has no legal basis.7
Politically, several Washington Congressmen feared the permit
would undermine the consistently held United States position against
commercial whaling at the International Whaling Commission, and
would create a dangerous precedent for our own marine mammal
policy.76 One Congressman stated that the U.S. has a national policy
against the capture of these animals for commercial gain.77 Another
Congressman, believing that the Act contemplated only serious sci-
entific research as a valid reason for a permit issuance, asserted "ex-
ploitation in the name of research is still exploitation. 7 8
As a summation, the testimony of a retired biologist for the U.S.
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is helpful to understand the oppo-
nent's position.79 He said, viewed strictly as a scientific experiment,
74. Id. at 14 (testimony of Congressman Bonkers). Some scientists were concerned
because Sea World has stated no hypothesis regarding how they plan to successfully
breed orcas in the present when they have been unsuccessful in the past. Although Sea
World cites their success with dolphin breeding, they don't provide any facts learned
from the dolphin breeding process which might be applied to orcas. See, e.g., at 94-5, id.
(testimony of Dr. M. Spencer, Scientist and Physiologist).
75. Id. at 205 (testimony of P. Watson, Field Agent for Fund for Animals).
76. Id. at 12, 15 (testimony of Congressman Bonker). The Congressman testified
that the Reagan Administration strongly supports a moratorium on all commercial
world-wide whaling. Therefore he stated, it is incongruous for the United States to sup-
port termination of commercial whaling, and yet still allow some form of domestic whal-
ing activity. Id. at 12.
77. Id. at 10 (testimony of Congressman Chandler); Id. at 4, (statement of Sena-
tor Gorton); Id. at 19 (testimony of R. Munro). Despite testimony to the contrary, it is
not entirely accurate that the U.S. has a national policy against the taking of whales for
commercial gain. Rather, the U.S. has a national policy against commercial whaling.
The MMPA does authorize the taking of non-depleted species for public display and
scientific research. Id. at 6 (statement of J. Johnson, Chairman for the Nat'l. Marine
Fisheries Service). More accurately, the issue is whether the Act embodies a national
policy opposed to taking marine mammals for public display used primarily for commer-
cial gain, and additionally whether Sea World's proposal is a form of commercial whal-
ing activity contrary to the U.S. policy against commercial whaling.
78. Id. at 46 (testimony of Congressman N. Dicks). Management administrators
testified they are concerned because very little sound scientific understanding exists on
the size of orca pods (family groups), their geographic range, or their habits. Therefore,
scientists are in a poor position to predict the effect of capture on whale populations. Id.
at 26-27 (testimony of Comm'r B. Boyle, Comm'r of Public Lands).
79. Id. at 132-3 (testimony of V. Scheffer, biologist retired from the U.S. Bureau
the proposal would enrich the aquarium industry and the wider sci-
entific community, and would be interesting to thousands of people.
The question becomes-is the price too high? New organizations de-
voted expressly to the welfare of cetaceans, and the observation that
whales have become for millions a symbol of wild free nature, sug-
gest that decisions affecting cetacean captivity can no longer be
guided by a consciousness that bases its decisions solely on increases
in scientific knowledge. This argument asserts that when the social
and moral costs of harassing 100 orca whales are considered, Sea
World's proposal is too expensive.80
Judicial Review
The Marine Mammal Protection Act states, "Any applicant for a
permit, or any party opposed to such permit, may obtain judicial
review of the terms and conditions of any permit issued by the Sec-
retary under this section or of his refusal to issue such a permit."81
The Act, however, does not enlighten the applicant or an opponent
as to the permissible scope of review. Two questions arise: 1) Who
qualifies as a "party opposed", and 2) What standards will be ap-
plied by courts in reviewing agency decisions?
The answer to the first question is relatively simple. Courts have
consistently held that environmental groups who participated in the
permit proceedings are parties opposed and have standing. 2 As to
the second question, Congress provided for review pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .13 Congress also intended to




81. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(6) (1976). Notice is to be initiated by filing an applica-
tion for review in the federal district court in the area of the applicant's residence or
principle place of business, or in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
within sixty days from the date that the permit was issued or denied. Id.
82. "There can be no doubt that appellants--eight environmental groups which
participated fully in the administrative proceedings and vigorously opposed grant of the
permit to [the applicant]--qualify as 'parties opposed'." Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps,
561 F.2d 1002, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1977); See also, Committee for Humane Legislation v.
Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976), af'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(Plaintiffs and plaintiff interveners, fourteen organizations whose common purpose is to
protect the natural environment, had standing under the MMPA).
83. "Such review shall be pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 5", 16 U.S.C. §
1374(d)(6) (1982).
84. See S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1972); H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1488, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4144, 4187. The relevant general federal jurisdiction statute sections are 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1337 ((1976) & Supp. V 1981).
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Questions of Fact
In reviewing factual decisions by the Fisheries Service, the courts
have used the APA "substantial evidence" test.85 Under this test, the
court decides questions of law but limits itself to the test of reasona-
bleness in reviewing findings of fact.86 Agency decisions based on
scientific and technical matters, within that agency's expertise, are
given particular deference.8 7 The Supreme Court mandates that
findings of fact supported by substantial evidence in the record are
conclusive.8
Friends of Animals v. Baldrige89 is illustrative. In this case, the
court said, in an area where complex scientific judgments must be
made on limited evidence, the court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. The court further said this deference will be
especially appropriate when the weight of expert opinion supports a
permit issuance. Most importantly, although the court was con-
cerned about the data's accuracy, it held that the decision to issue
the permit was based on substantial evidence, and must be upheld
even if the court would not have reached the agency's result had the
issue been before the court for determination." Similiarly, in an-
other case arising under the MMPA, the court in Animal Welfare v.
Kreps91 said its role in reviewing findings of fact is limited, and it
85. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(E) (1982).
86. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 520 (Supp. 1982).
87. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 36-38
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
88. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54 (1977);
N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965).
89. Friends of Animals v. Baldrige, discussed in DEPT. OF COM. 82/83 REP., supra
note 35, at 18-19.
90. Id. at 19; see also, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951) where the court used similiar instructions under the substantial evidence test,
"[A] court may [not] displace the [agency's] choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo."
91. 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the agency made a determination of fact on
the administrative record, so it must be supported by substantial evidence of the record
as a whole). Technically, the "arbitrary and capricious test" should be the applicable
standard. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that the substantial evi-
dence test be used for questions of fact which have been the subject of a proceeding "on
the record" (a hearing with a transcript of evidence). The hearing provided for in the
MMPA is an informal procedure, and not an adversaral hearing, (see supra, note 41 and
accompanying text). Questions not subject to the substantial evidence test are subject to
the arbitrary and capricious test. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982). However, in cases arising
under the MMPA, because an administrative record is kept, courts frequently use the
term "on the record" and have consistently applied the substantial evidence test for ques-
tions of fact.
can reject the Service's decision only if unsupported by substantial
evidence."2
After reviewing the public record and all the comments, the
agency found a substantial public benefit would be gained from the
contemplated public display, and that the anticipated manner of dis-
play outweighed any adverse effect on orca whale stocks. 93 While
conflicting views on the public benefit of orca whale display were
presented, this determination was not unreasonable looking at the
record as a whole. The evidence on the scientific implications of orca
whale capture was also conflicting; nevertheless, there was expert
testimony which supported the permit. The agency decision will be
given deference, and under a substantial evidence test a reviewing
court would uphold the agency's findings of fact.
Questions of Policy
The substantial evidence test may apply to review of policy deci-
sions,94 although precedent also supports the seemingly narrower
"arbitrary and capricious" test. 5 Under this test, a reviewing court
would determine whether the Fisheries Service's action was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with the law."96 Many reviewing courts have mixed the two
standards together.9 7
92. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d at 1013.
93. These are the criteria set forth in the agency rules. 50 C.F.R. § 216.31(c)
(1983).
94. The requirement of substantial evidence "applies to both factual determina-
tions and policy determinations by [the agency] even though application to the latter is
more difficult." Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 404 (5th
Cir. 1980).
95. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402, 414-415 (1971),
construed in F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803
(1978). In the Oveton Park case, the Supreme Court held review under the substantial
evidence test is authorized only when an agency action is taken pursuant to a rule-mak-
ing provision of the APA itself, or when the agency action is based on a public adjudica-
tory hearing. If the hearing is not designed to produce a record that is the basis of the
agency decision, it is quasi-legislative in nature, and the basic requirement for substantial
evidence review is not met. Id. at 414. See also Nat'l Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1,
33-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (In the area of rule-making the
agency can exercise its policy judgement as it sees fit, so long as its judgement is not
arbitrary and capricious).
Note however, that Citizens to Preserve Overton Park has been widely criticized for its
ambiguous language, and the decision has resulted in confusion as to the test's exact
meaning and application. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 86, at 518-533.
96. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1982).
97. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. E.P.A., 540 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir.
1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Wein-
berger, 512 F.2d 688, 705 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring). The reality may be
that the distinction between the two tests in reviewing policy decisions is largely seman-
tic, and that the two criteria tend to converge. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 n. 35 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 830
(1979); DAvis, supra note 86, at 522-23.
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It is arguable that the agency decision to issue the Sea World per-
mit does not effectuate the purposes of the MMPA.98 In every case
arising under the Act, a heavy burden is placed on the permit appli-
cant to show the taking will not work to the species' disadvantage,
and to show the populations are managed with the animals' interests
as the prime consideration." The legislative history reveals an intent
that if this burden is not met, the permit must be denied.100
The record demonstrates that to some extent, orca whales put in
captivity are harmed. The question becomes whether Congress in-
tended that the Act encompass a policy in which a permit issuance
cannot harm a marine species as a whole, or whether individual ani-
mals cannot be harmed.101 If it is the former, although scientists
were concerned about inadequate population data on orcas, 10 2 it was
not demonstrated that capturing ten whales over five years would
harm population levels, and the agency's decision should be upheld.
If the Act established a policy against harming individual animals
however, a better argument can be made that the agency decision is
contrary to the Act's policies and purposes.103 Most of the evidence
against the permit focussed on the adverse effects of captivity on
whales, while the majority of evidence supporting the permit stressed
the marine park's educational and scientific value. It can be argued
that the accusations that the animals living conditions are confining
and inhumane, and that the animals die more quickly in captivity,
were never satisfactorily answered. Under a substantial evidence
test, the record does not show that individual whales will not be
harmed. Under a strict arbitrary and capricious test, it is less clear
that the agency decision could be overturned as an abuse of discre-
98. The federal agency can issue a permit only if it is demonstrated that the taking
will be consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act. 16 U.S.C. §1374(d)(3)
(1982).
99. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4151.
100. Id. at 4151, 4158.
101. The legislative history shows Congress's belief that a management program is
best way to benefit the animals. One goal of such management is to prevent the animal
populations from exceeding the environment's carrying capacity and thus harming them-
selves. Id. at 4152.
102. Public hearing, supra note 55, at 141 (testimony of R. Osborne, Research
Director for Moclips Cetological Society).
103. For example, in overturning the Government's technical formula used to de-
termine the waiver of restrictions on baby sealskin importations, the court focused on the
individual animals themselves, and noted that the particular provision's statutory purpose
was based entirely on emotional concerns (Congress responding to public indignation
over the killing of baby nursing seals, perceived to be vulnerable and helpless) and not on
the resource management standards adopted by the Government. Animal Welfare v.
Kreps, supra note 82, at 1012.
tion. While realistically the court might well ask itself whether the
decision was reasonable,104 because the Act expressly gives the Fish-
eries Service the discretion to issue public display permits, and be-
cause the Act does not clearly mandate a policy against harming
individual animals, it is likely that a reviewing court would defer to
the agency's policy determinations.
Questions of Law
A reviewing court may substitute its judgement for that of an
agency on a question of statutory interpretation or law, even if the
agency's interpretation is peculiarly within its area of specializa-
tion.105 The custom, however, has been to give great weight or defer-
ence to the agency's view.10 The Supreme Court has reversed some
appellate courts for substituting their judgement for the agency's
and thereby exceeding their appellate review authority. 10 7 For exam-
ple, in a 1981 case,108 the Supreme Court said that since the Immi-
gration Act confers on the Attorney General the power to decide
what constitutes "extreme hardship", his construction of the stan-
dard should not "be overturned by a reviewing court simply because
it may prefer another interpretation of the statute."10 9 Nevertheless,
if there are "compelling indications that [the agency] is wrong"110
the reviewing court may overrule the agency's judgement; deferal to
the agency does not mean automatic affirmation.
Opponents to the permit argued that the MMPA prohibits the is-
suance of permits for commercial exploitation. While the Act does
not stipulate for what purposes a public display permit can be issued
to marine parks, the Act provides "the primary objective of [re-
source] management should be to maintain the health and stability
of the marine ecosystem." ' In explaining this provision, the House
Report stated that this objective "indicates that the animals must be
managed for their benefit and not for the benefit of commercial ex-
104. In MMPA cases, courts are reviewing agency decisions in which complex
facts and policies are intertwined, and the traditional tests cannot easily dictate the scope
of judicial review. Perhaps a more flexible approach requiring that the agency decision be
reasonable and that the administrator explain how the decision effectuates the purposes
of the law, would be a better standard for reviewing agency policy decisions. See DAvis,
supra note 86, at § 29.00-5, 552-55.
105. Id. at § 29.00-6, 558.
106. Id.
107. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57 (1977).
108. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139
(1981).
109. Id. at 144-45.
110. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973). See also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981) (the Supreme
Court interpreted the legislative history and statutory construction differently than did
the agency).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1982).
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ploitation. ' ' 2 While the legislative history reveals no specific discus-
sion on the kinds of public display permissible under the Act, 113 it
can be argued that the Act should not have been interpreted to allow
a permit to marine parks operated primarily for profit to capture
orca whales. 11 4 Additionally, it can be argued that Sea World's
stated goal of initiating a successful captive breeding program is not
a permissible reason to issue a public display permit; thus, the
agency incorrectly interpreted the act to allow permits for animal
husbandry.
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, a reviewing court
would be reluctant to substitute its judgement for that of the agency.
An argument can be made that such reluctance is misplaced, since it
is the court's role to interpret statutes. However, to overrule the
agency two major hurdles would have to be gotten over: first, the
court would have to agree that the statute was interpreted incor-
rectly, and second, the court would have determine that revoking the
permit is a proper remedy. Especially because the Act is largely si-
lent on the issue, it would take an unusually activist court to over-
turn the agency's statutory interpretation.
112. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4154. In Committee for Humane Legisla-
tion v. Richardson, 540 F.2d at 1148 n. 27, the court stated that the Act is to be admin-
istered for the benefit of the protected species rather than for the benefit of commercial
exploitation. See also Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1984) (the court
cited Committee for Humane Legislation in reiterating that the Act is not to be adminis-
tered for commercial exploitation).
113. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4158 (Secretary authorized to grant
public display permits upon a showing that the taking is consistent with the purposes of
the Act). A more recent indication of some members of Congress's attitude towards orca
whales in captivity is seen after the 1976 Budd Inlet incident (see notes 69-73 and ac-
companying text). At the public hearing, Congressman Bonkers cited a 1976 Senate
Commerce Committee Report which supported a bill to prohibit the taking of killer
whales "until we are absolutely convinced that the removal of these creatures from their
natural environment will not . . . harm the indigineous population. Specifically, there
should be no taking of the animal except for bona fide scientific purposes"; the legislation
was believed to be held pending until Sea World agreed not to capture whales off the
Washington coast. Public Hearing, supra note 55, at 14-15. Washington state Congress-
men Chandler and Norm Dicks, major instigators behind the MMPA's passage in 1972,
contend that Congress never intended to allow this type of orca whale capture, and that
there is not enough scientific use of the animals by Sea World to justify public display.
Telephone interview with John Geise, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Chan-
dler, Washington, D.C. (March 22, 1984).
114. For example, less exploitative conditions could include public display which is
purely educational, or in which the animals are kept in a large bay under the conditions
more closely resembling orca's natural habitat.
Opposition Through Legislative Channels
In addition to seeking judicial review, those opposed to the Sea
World permit can attempt to change the act's provisions through
legislative channels. Six congressmen from Washington State have
sponsored legislation that would prohibit Sea World, or anyone else,
from capturing orca whales for public display.115 The bill, introduced
by Representative Rod Chandler on November 17, 1983, would
amend the Act to ban permits for public display of orca whales; it
does not prohibit capturing whales for scientific research."16 Hear-
ings were held on the bill on March 15, 1984 in the House Subcom-
mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment
(a subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee).
The bill has 65 individual cosponsors from 25 states.""
The Sea World controversy has also caused widespread public
concern in Alaska,""8 and legislative action has been under-
115. 129 CONG. REc. H10147-48 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983)(statement of Rep.
Chandler). Support for approval of the permit already exists in Washington. One Con-
gressman cited Sea World's educational and research record, and argued, "they have
proven themselves to be a true and reliable friend to marine mammals," as he cautioned
against overturning the Fisheries Service's decision should the matter ever come before
the House. H.R. REP. No. 160, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 10149 (1983). (statement of Rep.
D. Hunter).
Protectionist interests acknowledge there is another argument against amending the
Act. The 1981 amendments to the Act excused oil and gas companies from the lengthy
and costly process of obtaining a regular permit. Also, the American Tuna Association's
lobbying resulted in the clarification of provisions and amendments which allow 20,500
Dali's porpoises to be killed annually through 1986. The political reality appears to be
that an attempt to amend the Act's public display provisions will also open the Act to
persons with nonprotective interests in marine mammals. The result may be contrary to
the very interests environmental groups are trying to protect. Interview with Dr. William
Evans, Director of Hubbs-Sea World Research Institute, San Diego (Nov. 8, 1983).
116. The bill is cosponsored by Washington State Reps. Thomas Foley, Al Swift,
Norm Dicks, Mike Lowry and Sid Morrison. News release from Congressman Rod
Chandler (Nov. 17, 1983).
117. Because it is controversial, it is possible that supporters of the bipartisan bill
will not lobby strongly for the amendment when the MMPA is up for reauthorization
this year. It would then be reintroduced in 1985. Telephone Interview with John Enright,
Press Secretary for Congressman R. Chandler, Washington D.C. (March 26, 1984).
Some environmental groups, which oppose the permit, have decided to lobby in support
of the proposed bill in lieu of seeking judicial review of the permit at this time. Tele-
phone Interview with Alan Reichman, Wildlife coordinator for Greenpeace, Washington
D.C. (Feb. 9, 1984).
118. Letters to Alaska's Governor Bill Sheffield's office regarding the killer whale
controversy have been running ten to one in opposition to Sea World; most of the writers
expressing anger that federal officials conducted no public hearings in Alaska before issu-
ing the permit. Los Angeles Times (San Diego ed.), May 13, 1984, at 1, col.2. Despite
the fact that last April Sea World urged support for the permit in every major newspaper
in Alaska, Paddy McGuire of the Alaska Fish and Game Commission classifies the furor
against the permit as "unprecedented' in the recent history of wildlife issues. San Diego
Union, June 7, 1984, at BI, col. 1. Another group dedicated to preserving orca whales
has joined the opposition to the permit and for unusual reasons. The Tlingits, a tribe of
480 members living on Admiralty Island, believe they can communicate with the orca
whale, and revere the animal as part of their mythology. To them, the orca whales, as do
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taken.1 9 On January 9, 1984 Sea World applied to the Alaska De-
partment of Fish and Games for a state permit 120 to capture the
whales whose capture had been authorized by the federal permit.
Although under the MMPA Sea World does not need Alaska's per-
mission to capture the whales, Sea World officials have assured the
Alaskan government that no captures will be attempted unless they
receive Alaska's approval. 2 In May 1984, Alaskan Governor Shef-
field announced the state's opposition to the capture. Sea World de-
clared, in July, it would capture no whales in Alaskan waters in
1984 but not whether it would proceed in the future despite state
disapproval. 22
A Suit Under NEPA
In Alaska, another approach has been taken to block Sea World's
orca capture. On May 1, 1984, the Sierra Defense Club, Inc. on
behalf of a coalition of individuals and charter businesses in Alaska,
filed suit in the U.S. district court of Alaska. a2 3 The plaintiff's al-
leged that the Fisheries Service actions violated the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA),' 24 which is a general overlay envi-
ronmental statute. The plaintiffs argue that the NEPA requires that
before the federal agency could permissibly have taken a final action,
which arguably will have an adverse impact on the environment,
they should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). In the absence of an EIS, the permit, plaintiffs contend,
would be invalid and void.125 They support this argument with the
people, have a right to live freely. Los Angeles Times (San Diego ed.), May 13, 1984,
part 1, at 1, col. 3.
119. The Alaskan Legislature has drafted a non-binding resolution demanding a
halt to the capture until the issue can be further studied. Joint Resolution 31 has passed
the state senate, but is now being held up in a House subcommittee by the Republican
majority. Telephone interview with Paula Turrell, Office of Representative Szymanski,
Juneau, Alaska (June 18, 1984).
120. Sea World applied for a permit pursuant to Alaska statute § 16.05.930.
121. Los Angeles Times (San Diego ed.), May 13, 1984, part 1, at 3, col. 4-5.
122. Anchorage Daily News, July 11 1984, at A-1, col. 5 and A-16, col. 1. Shef-
field also asked Commerce Sec. Baldridge to revoke the permit. Baldridge refused, saying
it provided adequate safeguards for the animals. Id. at A-16. While the collection pro-
gram is on temporary hold, Sea World will continue gathering data on the animals. Id.
at A-16, col. 3.
123. Jones v. Gordon J., 84-01 (D. Alaska filed May 1, 1984).
124. 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. (1969).
125. Complaint for the Plaintiff, Jones v. Gordon J., 84-01 (D. Alaska filed May 1,
1984), at 2, 27 [hereinafter cited as Complaint]. The plaintiffs futher argued that under
NEPA all federal actions are subject to an environmental assessment to determine
whether a full EIS is warranted. If the agency believes an EIS is unnecessary, it must
contention that the authorized "takings" may significantly disrupt
life cycles of small killer whale pods inhabiting Alaskan waters.126
Apparently, without public participation under NEPA,1 27 the
Fisheries Service concluded the taking of 100 whales in Alaska does
not require an EIS under NEPA. 128 Whether or not the plaintiffs are
correct in asserting an EIS was required in these particular circum-
stances will be determined by future court decisions. The attempt
represents, nevertheless, yet another potential route for environmen-
tal interests to move, procedurally and doctrinally, to protect ceta-
cean rights. 29
II
AN ARGUMENT FOR STANDING
The issue of standing has a particular significance in the Sea
World controversy. The Act's judicial review provision is fundamen-
tally limiting since an action can only be brought within 60 days of
the permit issuance.130 The Act allows the Fisheries Service to mod-
ify, suspend, or revoke the permit for either a violation of its terms,
or to make the permit consistent with Fisheries regulations made af-
ter the date of the permit's issuance." 1 The permittee is then enti-
issue a "Finding of No Significant Impact." The Fisheries Service did not comply with
these procedures. Id. at 24-25. The plaintiffs seek judicial review under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) which mandates that a court shall set aside any
agency action taken without observation of the procedure required by law, and Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) which mandates that a court shall set aside any
agency action which is in excess of statutory authority, arbitrary, and capricious. Com-
plaint, supra note 125, at 26.
126. Complaint, supra note 125, at 3. The Fisheries Service admits that "currently
little is known concerning the size, composition, structure, and productivity of the killer
whale population(s) in Alaska." See Memorandum from R.B. Brumstead to William G.
Gordon, Report on the Application of Sea World, Inc. for a Public Display/Scientific
Research Permit Under the Provisions of Sec. 101(a)(1) of the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972 (October 27, 1983) at 23 (hereinafter cited as Decision Memorandum).
127. One of NEPA's major purposes is to encourage and facilitate public involve-
ment in federal decisions which may affect the quality of the human environment. See 50
C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (1983).
128. It seems the decision was based on the Fisheries Service's past permitting
practices. Since 1974, over 400 permits have been issued and none have required an EIS.
Decision Memorandum, supra note 126, at 20. However, the plaintiffs argue that be-
cause the size of the "take" is unprecendented, and the potential adverse impacts to the
environment from the action unusually great, preparation of an EIS is required. Com-
plaint, supra note 125, at 23-24. They note that one issue raised by the Washington
State lawsuit (discussed infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text) was the NMFS' fail-
ure to prepare an EIS under NEPA prior to issuing the live capture permit. Complaint
at 23.
129. The full, detailed, consideration of the potential ramficiations of this new pro-
cedural and doctrinal attempt to protect cetacean rights is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. The author invites future additional comment concerning this innovative approach.
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(6) (1982).
131. Id. § 1374(e).
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tled to a hearing and the Director may allow public participation at
his discretion.3 2 A summary record of the hearing must be kept,133
and judicial review is possible, on the same basis as for the action on
the original permit.134
Environmental groups could participate in an agency action initi-
ated by the Fisheries Service. Subsequent to a Fisheries Service deci-
sion, either environmental groups or permittees such as Sea World
could obtain judicial review of that decision. However, the Act gives
environmental groups no procedure to force the agency to act, if, for
example, the capture of orca whales is done in an inhumane manner,
or if captivity is having a demonstrably adverse effect on the ani-
mals. While it is hoped the Service will enforce the provisions of the
MMPA, as it is required to do, it is troublesome there is no proce-
dure to force the agency to enforce the Act's provisions after the
permit has been granted.
The permit issued to Sea World states "Any display program in
which any of the marine mammals taken or imported hereunder are
to participate shall be designed so as not to fatigue or overwork the
mammals. A duly licensed veterinarian shall (so) certify to the As-
sistant Administrator."135 The permit also provides for inspection of
the Holder's records and facilities insofar as they pertain to activities
authorized by the permit, relate to species covered by the permit, or
pertain to the Assistant Administrator's responsibilities under the
Act."3 6 If citizens had standing, citizens could, at least, challenge the
acceptability of the animal's living conditions. Items such as the size
of the tanks or the sunlight and fresh air that the animals get could
come under scrutiny. Perhaps this strategy would be more in the
animal's immediate interest than a challenge to the idea of orca
whales on public display-an idea which may be with us for a long
time.
Citizen Suits
While Congress cannot authorize the exercise of judicial power in
the absence of a case or controversy, Congress may enact "statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing," even
132. 50 C.F.R. § 18.33(d)(3) (1983); 16 U.S.C. § 1374(e)(2) (1982).
133. 50 C.F.R. § 18.33(d)(3) (1983).
134. 16 U.S.C. 1374(e)(2) (1982).
135. Permit, supra note 47, General Conditions para. 6b. The permit does not stip-
ulate whether Dr. Cornell (Sea World's current veterinarian) will suffice, or whether a
disinterested veterinarian shall so certify.
136. Id. General Conditions para. 8.
though no legally recognizable injury would exist without the stat-
ute.137 Since the early 1970's, several major environmental statutes
have provided for citizen suits and broad judicial review. 138 The En-
dangered Species Act of 1973,139 for example, expressly authorizes
private citizens to sue in their own name to seek protection for an
endangered species."40 Barcelow v. Brown 4' held that the MMPA
has no citizen standing provision. The reasons why a citizen suit pro-
vision would be desirable are similar to those which will be discussed
in the subsequent section on standing.
Standing and the MMPA
The Administrative Procedure Act, in section 702, provides "Any
person suffering legal wrong because of an agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."1 42 Although
curiously courts have tended to ignore this provision's test for stand-
ing, 1 43 they have reached the conclusion that "adversely affected in
fact" or "injury in fact" is a test for standing. 4  Courts have added
to the injury in fact requirement, and although the predominantly
common law of standing is a confused area of law, three tests have
emerged.145
137. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
138. See, e.g., Clear Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1976); Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976). See also, Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(j-8) (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2618(a) (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)
(Supp. V 1981) (statutes which have citizen suit standing provisions).
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). The Act authorizes the Secretary of the In-
terior to list species that are threatened with worldwide extinction. After the Secretary
has compiled the list of endangered or threatened species, published it in the Federal
Register, and exhausted the proscribed hearing process, the Act makes it unlawful for
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take, import, or sell any
such species. Id. at § 1533. By 1978, the Secretary of the Interior had listed the Blue
Whale, Bowhead Whale, Finback Whale, Gray Whale, Humpback Whale, Right Whale,
Sei Whale, and Sperm Whale as endangered species. 43 Fed. Reg. 58, 036 (1978).
140. See, e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F.
Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Plaintiffs had standing
to sue in their own names as "next-friends" on behalf of palila finches).
141. 478 F. Supp. 646, 691 (D.P.R. 1979) (The plaintiff alleged that the U.S.
Navy was taking marine mammals in the course of its activities. The court held that as a
private citizen, the plaintiff had no standing to enforce the provisions of the MMPA).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
143. See generally DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 214-19 (2d ed.
1983)(discussion of court cases in the area of APA § 702).
144. See Id. at 215-18.
145. Id. at 212.
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The Three Tests for Standing
Injury in Fact
The first and most basic standing requirement is that the party
must suffer injury in fact.1 46 In a leading case which defines legally
protected interests, the Supreme Court stated "Aesthetic and envi-
ronmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingre-
dients of the quality of life in our society.' 1 47 Associational parties
may allege injury to the recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and educa-
tional interests of their members. 148 The magnitude of the injury is
of no consequence, relative to standing,, if injury can be shown. 149
An organization may have standing as the representative of its
members, based on injury to its members generally or even to a sin-
gle member.'1 0 An environmental group cannot be denied standing
solely because its members cannot be distinguished from other con-
cerned citizens.' 5 ' Environmental organizations could allege injury in
seeing the whales in captivity, in seeing inhumane treatment, and
that they have a personal stake in the maintenance of a safe and
healthful habitat for the animals. 52 These organizations could also
allege the federal agency's decision impairs their ability to see and
enjoy whales in their natural habitat under non-exploitive
conditions. 53
Causation
A second prerequisite to standing is a showing of a sufficient
causal relationship between the challenged act and the alleged in-
jury. 54 There must be a "substantial probability" that, if the court
146. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
147. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
148. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d, at 1007.
149. For example, the Supreme Court has allowed important interests to be vindi-
cated with no more at stake than a fraction of a vote, a $5.00 fine and costs, and a $1.50
poll tax. U.S, v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1973).
150. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
428 (1963).
151. Cf., U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, at 686-87.
152. For similar allegations, see Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d, at 1007.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Note, The Causal Nexus: What Must Be Shown for Standing to Sue in Federal Courts,
29 U. FLA. L. REV. 250 (1977).
affords the relief requested, the party's injury will be removed. 55
Environmental groups would have to allege that marine parks' treat-
ment of the animals is inconsistent with the terms of the permit or
the policies of the MMPA.156 If the court were convinced that the
causal connection is not purely speculative, this test would be met.157
Zone of Interest
A third test for standing, which some courts require, is that "the
interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interest
to be regulated by the statute."5 " Congress intended to protect
marine mammals and encourage their development to the greatest
extent feasible. 59 Assuming public display of orca whales is consis-
tent with the Act's purposes, it is still arguable that inhumane cap-
ture techniques or captivity conditions violates Congress' intent to
protect the animals. Therefore, ensuring that conditions in marine
parks are in the whales' best interest appears within the zone of in-
terest regulated by the MMPA, and environmental groups should be
able to assert the animals' interests in court.
Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps'60 used these three guidelines in
analyzing the standing issue in a MMPA suit brought by environ-
mental groups. The Animal Welfare court held that, notwithstand-
ing the absence of a special provision for judicially reviewing agency
regulations, Congress implicitly conferred standing (to challenge
waiver regulations) on the same categories of persons to whom it
gave standing to challenge permits. 61 Continuing its analysis, and
expressing a broad view of the law of standing, the court additionally
held "even if the statute did not provide the answer, appellants also
satisfy the three prerequisites for standing in the absence of a statu-
tory grant."'6 2
The problem with conferring standing on environmental groups
under three-test analysis is that it would only be effective when the
Fisheries Service had issued a permit or drafted a regulation. Only
under those circumstances could environmental groups allege that
new evidence shows that the animals should not be put in captiv-
155. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 504.
156. Cf., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d, at 1009-10 (for similar
pleadings).
157. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra note 154, at 42.
158. Association of Data Processing Organization, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1982). See also Balelo v. Baldrige, supra note 112 at
756. In Balelo the court stated, "Congress's overriding purpose in enacting the MMPA
was the protection of marine mammals."
160. 561 F.2d 1002.
161. Id. at 1006.
162. Id.
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ity,163 or that permit terms have been violated. Only selective judi-
cial scrutiny would be available because no case or controversy exists
unless a permit was previously issued. Therefore, the conditions of
other cetaceans in captivity would remain unchallenged under the
MMPA.16 4
A New Approach
Perhaps the most important criticism of litigating under tradi-
tional standing concepts is that such suits perpetuate the legal fiction
that human interests are being violated and that animals' interests
are only protected indirectly. Cetaceans themselves should have
standing. Two questions are raised by an argument for standing for
cetaceans in their own right: 1) Are there legal justifications for giv-
ing animals legal rights; and 2) Are cetaceans creatures who warrant
special law?
A Philosophical Argument
According to many philosophers, animals do not have rights sim-
ply because animals are not the kind of beings who can have
rights.16 5 Kant and the Utilitarians believed only rational beings,
meaning man alone, have rights and all the lowers animals are
viewed as mere machines towards which man has no ethical respon-
sibility.166 Descartes insisted that respect for human dignity does not
require respect for animals.1 67 The Judeo-Christian, belief that man
was granted dominion over animals,168 has been historically inter-
preted by the Western world to mean that because of man's immor-
tal soul, humans are superior to animals.16 9 In contrast, John Locke
163. Although testimony was presented at the hearings concerning the detrimental
effects of captivity on the animals, apparently the Fisheries Service was not sufficiently
convinced of such effects to deny the permit. New evidence would have to more conclu-
sively demonstrate detrimental effects before a reviewing court would be apt to revoke
the permit.
164. The conditions of other animals in marine parks, such as that of dolphins in
small feeder-pools, would continue to be outside the Act's protection.
165. See, e.g., I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 106 (1964).
166. See Brumbaugh, Of Man, Animals, and Morals: A Brief History, in ON THE
FIFTH DAY 18-19 (1978); Note, Using Metaright Theory to Ascribe Kantian Rights to
Animals Within Nozick's Minimal State, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 242, 247-251 (1979).
167. Brumbaugh, supra note 166, at 14.
168. "God created man in his own image ... [granting man] dominion over the
fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over cattle, and over all the earth, and
over every creeping thing . . . upon the earth." GENESIS 1:26-27 (Revised Standard
Version).
169. See, e.g., Comment, Rights for Nonhuman Animals: A Guardianship Model
believed man and animal share the same natural rights-life, liberty,
prosperity, and the right not to suffer at the hands of others.170 Al-
bert Schweitzer espoused a humane philosophy and conduct empha-
sizing reverence for all life.17 1
A legal right can be defined as a claim against others for their
acts or omissions on one's behalf which can be asserted before the
state for enforcement. 17 12 Arguments have been made for creating
"animal rights", in the legal sense, with the animals represented by
human beings.17 3 The concept that a person may represent another
person's interest in not new in the law; a trustee, guardian, or lawyer
is often such a representative. The law does not disqualify infants,
the insane, the senile, or the feeble-minded from exercising legal
rights simply because they cannot act to enforce or comprehend their
rights themselves.17 4 Similiarly, animals are beings who could have
recognized rights, and humans, as guardians, can enforce those
rights on the animals behalf.17 5
for Dogs and Cats, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 484, 494 (1977).
170. Fox, What Future For Man and Earth? Toward a Biospiritual Ethic, in ON
THE FiFTH DAY 229 (1978).
171. "The universal ethic of reverence for life shows sympathy with animals, which
is so often viewed as sentimentality, to be a duty which no thinking man can escape." A.
SCHWEITZER, ALBERT SCHWEITZER, AN ANTHOLOGY (1947).
172. Feinberg, Human Duties and Animal Rights, in ON THE FIFTH DAY 47
(1978).
173. To illustrate the arguments: Although Congress regulates the care, handling,
and treatment of animal's awaiting use in medical research, Congress has refused to
interfere with the actual experimentation process. Abuses such as the needless suffering
of research animals or using the animals to prove scientific points already well-estab-
lished, could be eliminated by expanding the notion of guardianship so that research
animals would have someone to allege ill-treatment for them. See Note, Use of Animals
In Medical Research: The Need for Governmental Regulation, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1733,
1738-1751 (1978).
Animal welfare groups have recently confronted the "factory farming" issue, charac-
terized by overcrowding, restricted movement, and unaesthesized surgical procedures.
General federal and state anti-cruelty statutes are the only source of farm animal protec-
tion. Enforcement through public (local police departments or special administrative
agencies) or private (local humane societies granted police power) enforcement agencies
is often ineffective. When concerned citizens cannot force these institutions to act, those
citizens, on behalf of the animals themselves, should have standing to bring civil actions.
See generally, J. Frank, Factory Farming: An Imminent Clash Between Animal Rights
Activists and Agribusinels, 7 B. C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 423 (1979).
174. A person need have no clear awareness of his predicament to be represented.
Mere possession of the interest is sufficient. For example, given a contract between a
policy holder and an insurance company to pay a sum to the holder's children upon his
death, the children have a right, which through their representative can be enforced in a
court of law. This is true even though they have no knowledge or understanding of the
contract which created the claim. Feinberg, supra note 172, at 54-57.
175. A similar argument can be made for the environment itself. For an excellent
discussion of the environment's rights, see C.D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STAND-
ING? (1974).
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Cetacean Intelligence
The extent of cetacean intelligence is an extremely complicated
question. Science is unsure what intelligence is (in humans, dolphins,
or whales) or how to classify it.17 6 Even though definitions of intelli-
gence vary,177scientists generally assume that brain size is a fac-
tor. 8 The sperm whale has the largest brain of any creature known
to have lived on earth, followed in order by the larger baleen whales,
elephants, the large delphinids (orca and pilot whales), bottle-nosed
dolphins and then human beings .17 9 A strict linear progression must
be corrected for .body size in proportion to brain size.180 The ratio of
the body's surface area to the volume of the brain has been called
the "cephalization" of the animals."81 Whales and dolphins stand
close to humans in terms of cephalization coefficients. 82
Because cerebral cortex development is generally regarded as the
morthological feature most clearly related to man's extensive behav-
ioral repertoire and intelligence, the cerebral cortex's structure has
been implicated in the arguments relating intelligence to cetaceans.
The most striking feature of whale and dolphin brains is the extent
of cerebral cortex fissuration.1 83 The new-cortex, or "new brain",
which is the wrinkled and convoluted gray area thinly covering the
surface of the cerebral hemispheres, has been shown to be complex
in cetaceans-especially dolphins (the most extensively studied ceta-
176. R. ELLIS, DOLPHINS AND PORPOISES 18 (1982).
177. Dictionary definitions of intelligence include "the ability to learn or under-
stand from experience" and the "faculty of thought and reason". See, e.g., WEBSTERS
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 732 (2d college ed. 1972).
178. ELLIS, supra note 176, at 20.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. The size of the brain is a measure of the total information processing capac-
ity. Taking the ratio of the brain size to body surface, then adjusting for the amount
required to handle ordinary body functions for average animals, there is created a useful
definition of intelligence from a neurobiological perspective. Jerrison, essay on Cetacean
Behavior, Intelligence, and the Ethics of Killing Cetaceans, presented at the 1980 IWC
Conference, reprinted in ELLIS, supra note 176.
182. Morgane, The Whale Brain: The Anatomical Basis of Intelligence, in MIND
IN THE WATERS 92 (1974). However, it must be emphasized that no serious worker in the
brain sciences is attempting to presuppose a correlation between intelligence and any
simple measure such as brain weight alone. The quality factor, as well as the quantity
factor, is critical. Id. Additionally, brain/body ratios in cetaceans differ. This suggests
they are varied in intelligence or that these ratios are poor correlates of animal intelli-
gence. This latter interpretation is the most widely accepted at the present time. Kruger,
Specialized Features of the Cetacean Brain, in WHALES, PORPOISES AND DOLPHINS 250
(K. Norris ed. 1966).
183. Kruger, supra note 182, at 134.
cean).284 The neo-cortex is believed to form perception, memory,
thought, and to be an index of the relative efficiency of the brain's
behavior regulation.188
The meaning of the intricate fissuration of the whale's cortex is
not yet known. The neurobiological evidence does not conclusively
link the whale brain with intelligence, and scientists differ on the
implications drawn from what is known.18 Furthermore, cetaceans
could represent an evolutionary path where the large brain and effec-
tive transmission and reception of information has evolved for a com-
pletely different reason that our own. Whales' brains may have
evolved to a high sophistication as a result of their almost perfect
adaptation to a completely aquatic existence.18 7
It is well-established that cetaceans are extremely capable animals
with a highly developed communications system. Whales navigate by
employing a sonar-like process---echolocation-whereby they emit
high frequency clicks and whistles, transmitting the sounds through
a "lens" of fat in the forehead.18 8 For years the United States Navy
has been conducting research and experimentation on dolphins. The
Navy has been attempting to emulate dolphins natural sonar capa-
bilities with electronic and computer equipment.18 9
184. See Morgane, supra note 182, at 86.
185. See Bunnell, The Evolution of the Cetacean Intelligence, in MIND IN THE
WATERS 56, 57 (1974); see also, MORGANE, supra note 182, at 85-88 (for discussion and
photographs of dolphin's cortex).
186. To illustrate a few areas of debate: Some researchers have reported that the
laminar differentiation (layering of the cortex) is poor in dolphins and most similar to
that of a rabbit. On the other hand, the enormous surface area of the dolphin cortex and
its highly convoluted appearance may be used as an argument for the superiority of
cetaceans. Kruger, supra note 182, at 237. The cortex of whales is relatively thinner than
comparable regions of other large brains, including human, but the total surface area if
far greater due to the tremendous infolding. Morgane, supra note 182, at 88.
The controversial cetologist John C. Lilly has done extensive studies on dolphins with
the concept of interspecies communications. Such communications presumably would
serve as a manifestation of dolphin intelligence. See generally, LILLY, MAN AND
DOLPHIN (1961). Dr. Lilly's work has been both criticized by scientists as being without
any scientific basis and commended by others as valuable and visionary.
187. ELLIS, supra note 176, at 21-22. In an unusual explanation for the complex
development of the cetacean brain, two Dutch biologists theorized that, because the
dolphin has not developed writing and therefore "culture," its communication capabilities
have had to develop in a compensatory fashion. Whereas humans can store their collec-
tive information in books and computers, dolphins, lacking the hands to build these arti-
facts, have had to store" all the knowledge in dolphin history. FICHTELIUS AND SJO-
LANDER, SMARTER THAN MAN? (1972).
188. C.f., 155 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 506, 515 (April 1979). There is a theory
that toothed whales can "ensonify" their prey, by projecting what in essence is a minia-
ture sonic boom, loud enough to kill or stun the prey. It is unclear how this works, but is
currently being studied. See ELLIS, supra note 176, at 17-18.
189. As yet the Nhvy has met with only limited success. Although they are often
secretive about their uses of dolphins and about the discoveries which they will disclose,
the Navy has reported that bionic sonar may bring them closer to duplicating dolphin's
sonar equipment. National Geographic, supra note 188, at 518-19.
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Scientific studies demonstrate that cetaceans are special and mys-
terious creatures with remarkably developed brains. Additionally, an
often overlooked but important aspect of the information about these
animals comes from people who have simply observed-for example,
those who watch the gray whales annual migration past West Coast
shores-or by people who have come in contact with the wild, living
animals. A recurrent observation is that cetaceans are aware of, and
often intensely conscious of, their human observers. 90 Whether this
unscientific feeling is an indication of a high intelligence, rather than
just something humans want to believe, remains to be seen.
A Recognition of Cetacean Rights
The concept that the law can, and maybe should, develop new
dimensions in the particular area of cetacean rights, is recognized in
Animal Welfare v. Kreps:
We cannot ignore the fact that the MMPA is an unusual statute: its sole
purpose is to promote protection of animals. Where an Act is expressly mo-
tivated by considerations of humaneness toward animals, who are uniquely
incapable of defending their own in court, it strikes us as eminently logical
to allow groups specifically concerned with animal welfare to involve the aid
of courts in enforcing the statute.'
Although the court said the appellants satisfied the traditional tests
for standing, the court, in essence, acknowledged the theme of this
comment-affording cetaceans rights with humans acting as their le-
gal guardians. Acknowledging this concept would not automatically
mean that all public display of cetaceans would be forbidden. Claims
would still be brought under the MMPS, which is, as previously dis-
cussed, a management as well as a protectionist statute. But a forth-
right approach has the advantage of being a more logical and honest
way to solve an unusual and sensitive legal issue.
III
CONCLUSION
It is a strange phenomena of human nature that mankind often
does not protect a species until the animal is in danger of extinction;
then humans frantically tries to repair the damage done. Meaningful
international protection of whales has come long after the need was
known. Although U.S. conservationist ideology is reflected in law,
190. See generally McIntyre, On Awareness, in MIND IN THE VATERS 69-70
(1978) (cetacean intelligence more accurately described as cetacean awareness).
191. Animal Welfare v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (1977).
the political war between special interest groups and protectionists
rages on, and the mentality that the natural world is a vast resource
for humans to exploit is still held by many.
Perhaps protection for whales from exploitation in the name of
public display and scientific research will come if humans are some-
day able to communicate with these animals. Perhaps freedom from
being viewed as animals to be captured and trained for human
amusement will come if cetacean intelligence is scientifically estab-
lished (at least by a human definition of intelligence). But perhaps
the real issue is human willingness to change our thinking; thus, in-
spiring laws that focus on the animals themselves and their rights
rather than on how they can be optimally sustained, ultimately for
human utilization.
As the legal system progresses, new human ideas and human
awarenesses are translated into law. Affording and upholding human
rights has been a major achievement of the legal system. Similiarly,
the legal arena is the place where the battle for cetacean's rights has
begun. Legally enforceable rights for whales and dolphins is an un-
usual, and perhaps even to some, a threatening idea. Yet it is not
such a radical concept when one realizes the goal is to preserve and
protect creatures we have only recently begun to understand and ap-
preciate. By giving cetaceans rights and allowing human individuals
or groups to sue on their behalf, or otherwise represent them in
court, the goal of effective protection will be more readily achieved.
MARY A. WINTERS
